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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
J U DGM ENTS-I NTEREST-ESTOPPEL
Sixteen years prior to the commencement of the present action, the
State of Oklahoma had accepted, as payment in full, the amount due
on a judgment rendered against the defendant. At that time, the state,
in fact, had made an error in computing the claim and now sues to recover
the additional amount due thereon, together with interest accrued from
the date of the old judgment. Held, neither laches nor estoppel operated
to defeat the state's claim, while acting in its sovereign capacity.1  State
v. Shull, 279 P.2d 339 (Okla. 1955).
'With few exceptions,2 a state acting in its "sovereign" capacity is not
subject to the defenses of laches,3 estoppel,4 or the statute of limitations.5
Under the prevailing view, these exemptions stem not from any notion of
extraordinary prerogative, but rather are allowed for reasons of public
policy., The vast majority of cases hold that estoppel will not be invoked
against the state even when there is negligence or omission by public
officers in the discharge of, or the failure to perform their duty,7 or where
the collection of funds is involved.8 And further, no estoppel ordinarily
results from acquiesence in the violation of a law,9 or from delay in
1. A state acts in its sovereign capacity when it acts for the common benefit
of all its people. Commonwealth v. Masden, 295 Ky. 861, 175 S.W.2d 1004, 1006(1943). A fundamental reason why there can ordinarily be no estoppel against the
public rights is that there is no one, except the legislature, who has authority to convey
away such rights. State v. Hutchins, 79 N.H. 132, 105 AtI. 519 (1919). Sovereign
functions have been defined as including those in which the state is dealing with
matters of revenue. Lovett v. City Treasurer of Detroit, 286 Mich. 159, 281 N.,V.576 (1938); State v. Brooks, 183 Minn. 251, 236 N.W. 316 (1931); Baker v. State
Highway Department, 166 S.C. 481, 165 S.F. 197 (1932).
2. E.g., in United States v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 20 F. Supp. 427(S.D. Cal. 1937), while holding for the United States, the court indicated, in strongdictum, the circumstances when the United States may be estopped. Florida Livestock
Board v. Gladden, 76 So.2d 291 (Fla. 1954); Att'y Cen. v. Central Ry., 68
NJ.L. 198, 59 Atl. 348 (1904).
3. State v. Moore, 49 Ariz. 51, 64 P.2d 809 (1937); Estate of Ramsay v. People.197 Il1. 572, 64 N.E. 549 (1902); State v. Excelsior Powder Mfg. Co., 295 Mo. 254,
169 S.W. 267 (1914).
4. Barnett Inv. Co, v. Nee, 72 F. Supp. 81 (W,.D. Mo. 1947); Greenwood v.
State, 230 Ala. 405, 161 So. 498 (1935); Donovan v. City of Santa Monica, 88 Cal.App.2d 386, 199 P.2d 51 (1948); Outer Dock & Wharf Co. %v. Los Angeles, 48 Cal.
App. 120. 193 Pac. 137 (1920).
5. Ex parte State, 206 Ala. 393, 90 So. 871 (1921): People v. Hamill, 239111. 506, 120 N.E. 1052 (1913): Horton v. Jones. 110 K1,. 540. 204 Pac. 1001 (1922).6. Bennett's Inc. v. Carpenter. ll1 Colo. 63, 137 P.2d 780 (1943): People
v. Bradford. 372 I11. 63, 22 NE.2d 691 (1939); Appeal of Valicenti, 298 Pa. 276,
148 Atl. 308 (1929).
7. E.o.. Board of Comm'rs of Sed~wick Count; v. Conners. 121 Kan. 105.
245 Pac. 10;0 (1926); People v. Detroit, G.H. & 1T\. Ry. 228 Mich. 596, 200
NW. 536 (1924); Traveler's Insurance Co. v. Frieke, 99 Wis. 7. 74 NV. 372 (1Q89 .
8. E.g., City of Clifton v. East Ridgelawn Cernctarv, 122 N.J.L. 115. 4 A.2d 79(1939) (an ordinance permitting the location of a ceinetary within municipality impnsed
a one dollar fee on each interment); Duhame v. State Tax Commission. 179 P,2d
2;2 (Cal. 1947).
9. People ax rel Nelson v. People's State Bank of Nlaywood, 354 I11l 519. 188
N.E. 853 (1933)(after 3 years, village trustees asserted that treasurer's deposits in
excess of penal sum of depositary bond were in violation of an ordinance).
CASENOTES
bringing suit.' However, equitable estoppel may be invoked against a
state with regard to acts done in its proprietary or private capacity, 1 as
distinguished from its sovereign or governmental capacity. In spite of
this well-settled rule, numerous attempts have been made to ignore the
distinction between governmental and proprietary functions, and substitute
therefor conceptions of universal justice, right, and fair play as a basis for
cstoppel. 12  The theory upon which these attempts rest is that estoppel
applies against the state in a "proper case"; although no court seems
yet to have attempted to define the words "proper case," being content
rather, to decide each piece of litigation upon the particular facts prc-
sented. 1a Thus, when a state recovered judgmcnt for taxes due during
certain years, it was estopped in another action to recover taxes for the
same years that were once the subject of litigation) 4 And, where it did
not appear that any public rights were adversely affected, the state could
not attack the status of a municipal boundary which had existed under
legislative enactment for a period of eight years.'5
In the instant case, the lapse of sixteen years did not supply the
elements necessary to constitute an estoppel against the state. There have
been decisions where, in addition to the lapse of time, other circumstances
rendered it contrary to right and justice for the state to exercise a particular
power, or to deny the validity of an act or contract. 1  Apparently the
majority herein did not find such additional circumstances. The dissent,
on the other hand, reasoning solely on the basis of fair play, asserted that
the state had no right and could not acquire a right either by design or
mistake to compel the defendant, against his will, to remain its debtor,
especially with regard to the ten per cent annual penalty interest (one
hundred sixty per cent)- 17
10. E.g., United States v. Standard Oil of California, 20 F. Supp. 427 (S.D.
Cal. 1937).
11. City of East Point v. Upchurch Packing Co., 58 Ca. App. 829, 200 S.L 210
(1938); City of New Castle v. Withers, 291 Pa. 216, 139 Ati. 860 (1927); Strand
v. State, 16 Wash.2d 107, 132 P.2d 1011 (1943).
12. E.g., Farrell v. Placer County, 23 Cal.2d 625, 145 P,2d 570 (1944); cf.
Los Angeles v. Los Angeles County, 72 P.2d 138 (Cal. 1937). In addition, Florida
has attempted to accomplish this intent, in the collection of license taxes, by legislative
enactment. FLA. STAT. § 205.12 (1955).
13. E.g., State v. Horr, 165 Minn. 1, 205 N \W. 444 (1925).
14. Bridge Co. v. Douglas, 12 (Bush) Ky. 673 (1877).
I. State ex rel Landis v. Coral Cables, 120 Fla. 492, 163 So. 308 (1935).
16. E.g., People ex rel Petty v. Thomas, 361 Ill. 448, 198 N.E. 363 (1935);
Village of Clawson v. Van Wagoner, 268 Mich. 148, 255 N.W. 743 (1934); Boardwalk
& Seashore Corp. v. Nlurdock, 26 N.Y.S.2d 319, 36 N.E.2d 678 (1941); Ervin v
Pittsburgh, 339 Pa. 241, 14 A.2d 297 (1940).
17. The theory upon which interest on judgments is allowed is that it is a
measure of damages fixed by the legislature; it is not interest in its strict sense, nor
is it based on any contract express or implied, since a judgment is not a contract
save in a very recondite and remote sense of term. See Morley v. Lake Shore & NI.S.R.
Co.. 146 U.S. 162 (1892); Wyoming Nat'l Bank v. Brown, 7 'Wyo. 494, 53 Pac. 291
(1898).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
The decision in the present case is in conformity with the well-settled
doctrine that a sovereign, while functioning governmentally, cannot sleep.
However, since a relatively large amount of interest had accrued; and since
interest on a judgment is generally considered to be a measure of damages
as distinguished from compensation for use of money,' 8 it appears grossly




During disbarment proceedings in the Circuit Court, an attorney's
license to practice was rescinded because he refused to reply to interrogations
by the presiding Judge as to whether he was presently, or had ever been,
a member of the Communist Party, on the ground that his answer might
tend to incriminate him. Held, reversed. Appellant's refusal to answer
being insufficient, without more, to sustain the Circuit Court's ruling, and
due process having been denied the attorney by the court's presumption
of his guilt. Sheiner v. State, 82 So.2d 657 (Fla. 1955).
The precise question presented in the instant case had not been
adjudicated previously in Florida, nor in any of her forty-seven sister
states. While there are a number of grounds for disbarment, they are
often stated in broad general terms' which make them difficult to interpret.
The practice of law is generally considered a privilege,2 and the purpose
of disbarment has been held to be for the protection of the public and
the courts and not to punish the attorney. '  For this reason, it has been
held that disbarment is neither a prosecution, penalty, nor forfeiture.'
However, the Florida view is contra, the precedent for the court's decision
in the Sheiner case having been established in Florida State Board of
Architecture v. Seymour 5
18, Ibid.
1. E.g., misconduct rendering an attorney unfit to be entrusted with the powers
and duties of his office In re Clifton, 115 Fla. 168, 155 So. 324 (1934); conduct
showing such lack of good moral character as to render the attorney unworthy of
public confidence: Connecticut Grievance Comm. of Hartford County Bar v. Broder,
112 Conn. 263, 152 Atl. 292 (1930).
2. On the federal level: Application of Levy, 348 U.S. 887 (Tex. 1954); FEn,
SUP. CT. R., RULE 58; Conmmunist Control Act of 1954, 50 U.SC.A. §§ 841-844.
State cases: In re Anastoplo 3 I1l. 2d 471, 121 N.E. 2d 826 (1954); In re Clifton.
supra note 1.
3. Ex parte Wall, 107 U. S. 265 (1882); in re Mains, 121 Mich. 603, 80 N.W.
714, 716 (1899); People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 162 N.E. 487.
4. In re Rouss, 116 N.E. 783 (N.Y. 1917).
5. 62 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla, 1952): "It is, accordingly, our view that a proceeding
to revoke appellee's certificate as an architect amounts to a prosecution to effect a
penalty or forfeiture as contemplated by Section 932.29, Florida Statutes, 1941,
F.S.A .. " in re Durant, 80 Conn. 140, 67 Ati 497 (1907) agrees with the
Florida view,
